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MASSACHUSETTS AND OREGON LAWS ENCOURAGE EARLY RESOLUTION OF MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE CLAIMS: DHHS THREATENS TO HINDER REFORM
By
Jena Druck*
I.   INTRODUCTION
Concerns regarding the impact of our nation’s medical liability system on the
cost and availability of insurance has prompted numerous reforms modifying the rules of
medical malpractice litigation.1 In recent years, reform efforts have focused more on
reducing claims and promoting safety.2 This article seeks to discuss the impact of
national reporting requirements of medical malpractice payments on modern reform
efforts. Specifically, this article will examine a recent ruling from the Department of
Health and Human Services (“DHHS”) interpreting requirements to report payments for
medical malpractice claims to the National Practitioner Data Bank (“NPDB”), how those
requirements affect legislative programs enacted and implemented in Massachusetts and
Oregon, and whether they serve to hamper reform efforts that encourage alternative
dispute resolution. Despite their goal to monitor physician competence and ultimately
improve patient safety, the NPDB reporting requirements may actually serve to
encourage litigation rather than alternative dispute resolution. Thus, by affirming the
applicability of the NPDB reporting requirements to recent legislation, the DHHS ruling
may serve to hamper efforts at reform.
II.  CONTEXT FOR MASSACHUSETTS AND OREGON REFORMS
A.  Traditional Malpractice Reform
The usual avenue for medical malpractice claims through the tort liability system
serves to compensate injured patients and guard against future error.3 Goals of litigation
include justice, compensation, and deterrence.4 Although justice may be achieved,
*

Jena Druck is Associate Editor of The Yearbook on Arbitration and Mediation and a 2016 Juris Doctor
Candidate at The Pennsylvania State University Dickinson School of Law.
1

Fred J. Hellinger and William E. Encinosa, Review of Reforms to Our Medical Liability System,
AHRQ.GOV , http://www.ahrq.gov/professionals/quality-patient-safety/patient-safety-resources/resources/
liability/reforms.html (last visited October 15, 2014).
2

Id.

3

Edward A. Dauer & Leonard J. Marcus, Medical Malpractice: External Influences and Controls: Article:
Adapting Mediation to Link Resolution of Medical Malpractice Disputes with Health Care Quality
Improvement, 60 L AW & C ONTEMP. P ROB . 185, 185 (1997).

4

Haavi Morreim, Moral Hazard: The Pros and Cons of Avoiding Data Bank Reports, 4 D REXEL L. R EV .
265, 267 (2011).
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evidence suggests the goals of compensation and deterrence are not well met.5
Traditional tort reform can generally be classified into three categories based upon the
reform’s intention to (1) limit liability and control awards; (2) decrease the number of
claims; or (3) facilitate settlement.6 Reforms that limit liability include caps on damages,
modifications to the collateral source rule,7 provision of periodic payments rather than
lump sum payments, modifications to pleading damages, modifications to joint and
several liability rules, limiting or prohibiting punitive damages, and altering burden of
proof and evidentiary rules.8 Reforms initiated to decrease the number of claims include
rules surrounding statutes of limitations, limiting contingency fees, awarding costs for
frivolous suits, and requiring a certificate of merit as a condition of filing.9 Reforms
intended to facilitate settlement include requiring notice to sue, encouraging or requiring
arbitration, and instituting pre-trial screening panels.10 Unfortunately, many of these
traditional reforms ignore the goals of improving patient safety and encouraging
communication regarding negative outcomes.11
B. Recent Efforts in Malpractice Reform Focus on Patient Safety
In recent years, reform efforts have focused more on reducing claims and
promoting safety.12 Reforms that promote full disclosure, early offers, and collection of

5

Morreim, supra note 4 at 268. The goal of compensation is poorly served because most negligently
caused injuries never result in a claim, a large proportion of filed claims are not connected with negligent
injury, and the majority of damage awards go toward paying attorney fees and expenses rather than
compensating claimants. Id. Litigation’s deterrence function poorly serves quality improvement because
most adverse events result not from result provider error, but from system flaws that can only be solved
through communication between physicians, nurses, administrators, patients, and families; and, the fear of
litigation leads to defensive practices and inhibits much-needed communication. Id. at 268-69.
6

JAMES E. LUDLAM, 3-15 TREATISE ON HEALTH CARE LAW §15.05 (Matthew Bender & Company, Inc.
2014).
7

The collateral source rule is a common-law doctrine permitting an injured party to recover full
compensatory damages regardless of payment received through benefits or other forms of compensation
independent of the tortfeasor (i.e. insurance, worker’s compensation, unemployment, etc.). James J.
Watson, Annotation, Validity and Construction of State Statute Abrogating Collateral Source Rule as to
Medical Malpractice Actions, 74 A.L.R. 4 TH 32, Note 1 (1989).
8

LUDLAM, supra Note 6, at §15.05[1].

9

Id. at §15.05[2].

10

Id.

11

See Kelly Bogue, Innovative Cost Control: An Analysis of Medical Malpractice Reform in
Massachusetts, 9 J. H EALTH & B IOMED . L. 87, 96 (2013).
12

Hellinger and Encinosa, supra note 1.
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the causes of medical errors focus on patient safety as one of the primary goals.13 A
number of medical institutions and insurers operate programs that require practitioners to
disclose medical errors to patients, leading to rapid and fair compensation, as well as
collection of data.14 When a provider discovers an error, efforts to disclose that error,
apologize to the patient or family, and work together toward an early resolution provide
the opportunity to not only compensate the patient, but also preserve relationships, save
costs, shorten resolution times, reduce lawsuits, and promote the exploration necessary to
improve quality.15
Passed in March 2010, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
(“PPACA”) focused on improving access to health care as well as cost-containment.16
The PPACA recommended Congress develop programs to explore alternatives to the
current litigation system and encouraged states to develop and test alternatives.17 An
amended section of the Public Health Service Act authorized the Secretary of DHHS to
award grants to states “for the development, implementation, and evaluation of
alternatives to current tort litigation for resolving disputes over injuries allegedly caused
by health care providers or health care organizations.”18
As a result, the DHHS awarded $25 million in grants for medical liability reform
projects through the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality’s (“AHRQ”) Patient
Safety and Medical Liability Reform Initiative.19 The initiative intended to “improve[d]

13

Hellinger and Encinosa, supra note 1.

14

Id.

15

Morreim, supra note 4 at 270.

16

See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 111 Pub. L. No. 148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 26 and 42 U.S.C.).
17

Id. at 804. Section 6801 states:

It is the sense of the Senate that – (1) health care reform presents an opportunity to address issues related to
medical malpractice and medical liability insurance; (2) States should be encouraged to develop and test
alternatives to the existing civil litigation system as a way of improving patient safety, reducing medical
errors, encouraging the efficient resolution of disputes, increasing the availability of prompt and fair
resolution of disputes, and improving access to liability insurance, while preserving an individual’s right to
seek redress in court; and (3) Congress should consider establishing a State demonstration program to
evaluate alternatives to the existing civil litigation system with respect to the resolution of medical
malpractice claims. Id.
18

42 U.S.C. § 280g-15(a) (2010).

19

Press Release, United States Department of Health and Human Services, HHS Announces Patient Safety
and Medical Liability Demonstration Projects (June 11, 2010), available at http://wayback.archiveit.org/3926/20131018160402/http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2010pres/2010.html#June. “The projects we
have funded help create measurable differences in the safety of health care for patients and help bring
rationality and fairness to our medical liability system.” Id. (quoting Carolyn M. Clancy, M.D., AHRQ
director.)
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the overall quality of health care by making patient safety the primary goal.”20 The
AHRQ issued 20 grants, allocating $23 million to support efforts to create, implement,
and evaluate patient safety and medical liability reform and $2 million to evaluate the
initiative.21 The funds received through this initiative supported efforts that laid the
groundwork for the Massachusetts law discussed below.22 Programs developed in
Massachusetts and Oregon not only encourage disclosure and open discussion between
practitioners and patients, but also provide the opportunity for financial restitution outside
of the court system.23
III.   MASSACHUSETTS AND OREGON LAWS : ENCOURAGING EARLY RESOLUTION
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CLAIMS

OF

A.  Massachusetts: Disclosure, Apology, and Offer
As part of a package of statutory reform entitled “An Act Improving the Quality
of Health Care and Reducing Costs through Increased Transparency, Efficiency and
Innovation,”24 Massachusetts instituted a Disclosure, Apology and Offer (“DA&O”)
program.25 The law stipulates a pre-litigation period of alternative dispute resolution
characterized by patient notice, sharing of medical records, disclosure of errors, and
inadmissibility of providers’ statements of apology.26 Six hospitals initially
operationalized the DA&O program through the Communication, Apology, and
Restitution (“CARe”) model.27
20

Carolyn M. Clancy, Patient Safety and Medical Liability Reform: Putting the Patient First, AHRQ.GOV ,
http://www.ahrq.gove/news/newsroom/commentaries/putting-patients-first.html (last visited October 1,
2014).
21

Id.

22

See Memo from Mary K. Wakefield, Ph.D., R.N., Administrator, Department of Health and Human
Services, to Kathleen Sebelius, Secretary, Department of Health and Human Services (May 20, 2014), 2
[hereinafter
DHHS
Memo](on
file
with
author),
available
at
http://www.citizen.org/
documents/2211%20Enclosure.pdf.
23

Id.

24

Enacted August 6, 2012.

25

An Act Improving the Quality of Health Care and Reducing Costs Through Increased Transparency,
Efficiency and Innovation, 2011 Mass. S.B. 2400.
26

See Dan McDonald, Massachusetts Bar Association Moves to Stem Skepticism as Med-Mal Reforms
Take Effect, MASSACHUSETTS LAWYERS WEEKLY, June 12, 2013.
27

See DHHS Memo supra note 22 at 3. See also, MASSACHUSETTS ALLIANCE FOR COMMUNICATION AND
RESOLUTION FOLLOWING MEDICAL INJURY, http://www.macrmi.info (last visited October 26, 2014).
(“CARe is about timely communication of important information and supporting families though an
adverse outcome.”)
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Under the Massachusetts law, an injured party must provide a pre-litigation notice
to the health care provider 182 days before commencing a court-based action.28 This six
month period provides “an opportunity to clear the air and put the cards on the table.”29
Once notice is received, the provider has 150 days to furnish a written response to the
injured party.30 If the provider fails to do so, the injured party may file a claim alleging
medical malpractice.31 To encourage provider response, interest on subsequent judgment
is calculated from the date the notice is filed, rather than the date the suit is filed.32
The law also requires an injured party to allow the health care provider access to
medical records within his or her control, and provide a release for records not within his
or her control, within 56 days after giving notice.33 A provider must “fully inform” the
patient about unanticipated outcomes with significant medical complications that arose
from the provider’s mistake.34 The provider will meet with the injured patient or family
to explain what happened and how it will affect the patient’s care.35 To encourage
apology, any statement of regret, mistake, or error by the provider is inadmissible in a
later malpractice action unless the person who makes the statement also makes a
contradictory or inconsistent statement during trial.36 After information is shared
between the parties, the provider can work with the insurer to determine an appropriate
settlement amount.37 If the provider determines there will be no settlement offer, the
provider informs the claimant in writing within the notice period, and the claimant is free
to commence an action.38

28

MASS. GEN. LAWS 231 §60L(a).

29

See, McDonald, supra Note 26 (quoting Martin W. Healy, Chief Legal Counsel for Massachusetts Bar
Association).
30

MASS. GEN. LAWS 231§60L(g).

31

MASS. GEN. LAWS 231§60L(h).

32

MASS. GEN. LAWS 231§60L(h), see also A.L.M. G.L. ch. 231§60K.

33

MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, §60L(f).

34

MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 233 §79L(b).

35

See, MASSACHUSETTS ALLIANCE FOR COMMUNICATION AND RESOLUTION FOLLOWING MEDICAL INJURY,
About CARe, http://www.macrmi.info (last visited October 26, 2014).
36

MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 233 §79L.

37

See, Bogue, supra note 11 at 108.

38

MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, §60L(i).
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B. Oregon: Early Discussion and Resolution
Oregon’s Early Discussion and Resolution program, created through Senate Bill
483,39 includes three distinct phases of medical liability: (1) early discussion and
resolution; (2) mediation; (3) and access to the legal system.40 The program aims to
improve patient safety by providing an alternative way for patients to resolve conflict
with providers and giving them a “safe space to learn, heal[, and] then move on.”41 If
resolution is not achieved, the parties can seek help from a mediator before moving on to
litigation.42
The Early Discussion and Resolution program enables providers and patients to
resolve serious medical events through discussion rather than traditional adjudication
within the court system.43 When an “adverse health care incident”44 occurs, a provider,
provider’s employer, health care facility, or patient may file a notice of adverse event
with the Oregon Patient Safety Commission (“OPSC”),45 and a copy is provided to the
patient.46 This notice triggers a voluntary confidential discussion between the patient and
provider, which may include an explanation of what happened, an apology, information
about how the provider will prevent harm in the future, and compensation if
appropriate.47 A facility or provider who files, or is named in the notice, may engage in a
discussion with the patient, communicate the steps the facility or provider will take to
prevent future occurrences of the incident, and determine whether an offer of
compensation is warranted.48 If an offer is warranted, the facility or provider extends the
39

Senate Bill 483 was enacted March 25, 2013, became operative July 1, 2014, and is set to expire
December 31, 2023. 2013 O RE . L AWS 5, 2013 at §§20, 21.
40

Governor Kitzhaber Testimony on SB 483, States News Service, February 14, 2013.

41

Saerom Yoo, New Program to Mediate Health Care Problems, S TATESMAN JOURNAL , July 2, 2014 at A14 (quoting Oregon Patient Safety Commission, Executive Director Bethany Walmsley).
42

Id.

43

Id.

44

An “adverse health care incident” is defined as an “objective, definable and unanticipated consequence of
patient care that is usually preventable and results in the death of or serious physical injury to the patient.”
2013 O RE . L AWS 5, 2013 at §1(1).
45

The OPSC is a state agency comprised of a 17-member board of directors appointed by the Governor of
Oregon and is charged with reducing the risk of serious adverse events and encouraging patient safety.
O REGON P ATIENT S AFETY C OMMISSION , http://www.oregonpatientsafety.org/who-we-are (last visited Oct.
26, 2014).
46

2013 ORE. LAWS 5, 2013 at §2.

47

Nick Budnick, New Oregon Program Allows Mediation for Medical Errors Instead of Suing, THE
OREGONIAN, July 1, 2014. See also, OREGON PATIENT SAFETY COMMISSION, Early Discussion and
Resolution, http://edr.oregonpatientsafety.org/reports/content/edr (last visited October 26, 2014).
48

2013 ORE. LAWS 5, 2013 at §3(1).
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offer in writing to the patient and advises the patient of his or her right to seek legal
advice before accepting the offer.49 If the patient accepts the offer, the facility or
provider must then notify the OPSC.50 But, if discussions do not result in resolution, the
parties may enter mediation.51 As in early discussion, the facility or provider must advise
the patient of his or her right to seek legal advice before accepting an offer of
compensation through mediation.52
Early discussion or mediation under this Act does not prevent a patient from
bringing a civil action.53 Discussions and offers, however, do not constitute admissions
of liability,54 and expressions of regret or apology are not admissible in adjudicatory
proceedings.55 Evidence of an offer of compensation and the amount, payment, or
acceptance of compensation is inadmissible as well; any adjudicated judgment in favor of
the patient, however, must be reduced by the amount of compensation paid under this
Act.56 The law specifically designates that payments made as result of early discussion
or mediation do not constitute payments resulting from written claims or demands for
payment.57 Therefore, they are excluded from the NPDB reporting requirement.58
The OPSC will use notices of adverse health incidents to establish quality
improvement techniques to reduce patient care errors, develop evidence-based prevention
practices, and assist facilities and providers in reducing the frequency of particular
incidents.59 The OPSC may use and disclose information regarding discussions and
offers to assist facilities and providers in determining the cause and potential mitigation
of the incident; the OPSC may not, however, disclose information regarding discussions

49

2013 ORE. LAWS 5, 2013 at §3(5).

50

2013 ORE. LAWS 5, 2013 at §3(8).

51

2013 O RE . L AWS 5, 2013 at §5(1). The parties may choose a mediator from a panel of qualified mediator
maintained by the Oregon Patient Safety Commission, or they may choose from outside this list. Id. at
§5(2).
52

2013 ORE. LAWS 5, 2013 at §5(5).

53

2013 ORE. LAWS 5, 2013 at §7(1).

54

2013 O RE . L AWS 5, 2013 at §4(2)(a). A party may move the court to admit as evidence discussion that
contradicts a statement made during the subsequent adjudicatory proceeding, and the court shall allow it as
evidence only if it is material to the claim presented. Id. at §4(3)(a).
55

2013 ORE. LAWS 5, 2013 at §4(2)(c).

56

2013 ORE. LAWS 5, 2013 at §7(5).

57

2013 ORE. LAWS 5, 2013 at §6(1).

58

Id.

59

2013 ORE. LAWS 5, 2013 at §9(2).
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and offers to a regulatory agency or licensing board.60 This Act also establishes the Task
Force on Resolution of Adverse Health Care Incidents,61 which evaluates the
implementation and effects of the Act and reports to the Legislative Assembly on
recommendations to improve resolution of incidents if needed.62
IV.   MEDICAL MALPRACTICE PAYMENTS
BANK

AND THE

NATIONAL PRACTITIONER DATA

In 1986, Congress enacted the Health Care Quality Improvement Act
(“HCQIA”)63 which established the NPDB to aid physicians in peer review activities by
collecting information on adverse professional review actions, state medical board license
sanctions, and medical malpractice payments.64 The NPDB aims to prevent negligent
physicians from moving to another state in an effort to escape a record of incompetence
and to improve peer review.65 Each hospital is required to query this database when
credentialing a provider, and every two years thereafter.66
A.  NPDB Reporting Requirements
Any healthcare or insurance provider who makes a payment in satisfaction of a
medical malpractice action or claim is required to report information regarding that
payment and circumstances thereof to the NPDB.67 The HCQIA defines a “medical
malpractice action or claim” as “a written claim or demand for payment based on a health

60

2013 ORE. LAWS 5, 2013 at §10(2).

61

The task force is comprised of 14 members appointed by Oregon Governor John Kitzhaber. OREGON
PATIENT SAFETY COMMISSION, Discussion and Resolution Task Force, http://oregonpatientsafety.org/
discussion-resolution/task-force (last visited October 26, 2014).
62

2013 ORE. LAWS 5, 2013 at §17.

63

Health Care Quality Improvement Act, 42 U.S.C. §§11101-11152 (2006).

64

See Julie Barker Pape, Physician Data Banks: The Public’s Right to Know Versus the Physician’s Right
to Privacy, 66 F ORDHAM L. R EV . 975, 977 (1997).
65

See id. at 981. See also, Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. §11101(2) (2006).
(“There is a national need to restrict the ability of incompetent physicians to move from State to State
without disclosure or discovery of the physician’s pervious damaging or incompetent performance.”); 42
U.S.C. §11135(b) (2006). (“With respect to a medical malpractice action, a hospital which does not request
information respecting a physician or practitioner as required [] is presumed to have knowledge of any
information reported under this part to the Secretary with respect o the physician or practitioner.”)
66

Health Care Quality Improvement Act, 42 U.S.C. §§11135(a) (2006).

67

Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. §11131 (2006).
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care provider’s furnishing (or failure to furnish) health care services...”68 A claim is
reportable when four elements are met: (1) payment, (2) by a third party, (3) for the
benefit of a health care practitioner, (4) against whom a medical malpractice claim or
judgment was made.69 By requiring reports of payments on an action or claim, the
HCQIA requires reports when cases are settled as well as when litigation results in
judgment against practitioners; these reports are made regardless of whether providers are
found responsible for the injury.70
B. Concerns Regarding the Reporting Requirement
Although the NPDB is intended to facilitate the link between compensation and
risk reduction, some suspect it actually exacerbates the difficulties of achieving more
effective forms of claim resolution.71 Because records are permanent, early settlement
resulting in payment of a claim leads to a “permanent ‘black mark’ in the NPDB,” even if
settlement is the best choice for those involved.72 Providers are faced with the choice of
working toward an early mediated resolution, which will result in an almost immediate
report to the NPDB, or going to trial, the lengthy nature of which will delay reporting of
the claim to the NPDB.73 Because the NPDB requires reporting of medical malpractice
payments regardless of whether the physician is found negligent, it prompts physicians to
take their chances in litigation, where they have a better chance at winning, rather than
settle through mediation.74 This chilling effect on mediation is in conflict with Congress’
intent as expressed in the PPACA.75
The NPDB’s effect of deterring physicians from entering into early dispute
resolution can be more harmful to quality improvement than the benefits of the reporting
68

Health Care Quality Improvement Act, 42 U.S.C. §11151(7) (2006).

69

Id. at 2.

70

See DHHS Memo, supra Note 22 at 2.

71

Edward A. Dauer & Leonard J. Marcus, Medical Malpractice: External Influences and Controls: Article:
Adapting Mediation to Link Resolution of Medical Malpractice Disputes with Health Care Quality
Improvement, 60 L AW & CONTEMP. P ROB . 185, 185 (1997).
72

Morreim, supra note 4 at 272-73.

73

See id. at 272.

74

Teresa M. Waters et al., Impact of the National Practitioner Data Bank on Resolution of Malpractice
Claims, 40 INQUIRY 283, 290 (2003) (finding NPDB concerns made physicians less willing to settle
cases).
75

Applicants for grant awards authorized by the DHHS Secretary were asked to show, inter alia, how their
proposal would increase the availability of prompt and fair resolution of disputes, encourage efficient
dispute resolution, encourage error disclosure, and enhance patient safety by reducing errors and adverse
events. 42 U.S.C. §280g-15(c)(2) (2006).
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system, and may make avoiding reporting to the NPDB more desirable.76 Although the
HCQIA requires reporting of all medical malpractice payments, “the reality is that a
number of avenues permit legitimate escape,” thus diminishing the effect of the NPDB’s
usefulness as a means of warning hospitals and medical boards of incompetence.77
Several options have been identified that give providers the ability to make a payment to
the injured party without prompting the duty to report which include paying the claim out
of pocket,78 waiving the patient’s debt, or refunding the patient’s payment.79
Additionally, because the trigger for an NPDB report is a “written claim or demand for
payment,” a provider may avoid the reporting requirement when a patient makes an
unwritten claim or demand, regardless of whether contact is initiated by the patient or the
physician.80 A physician can also utilize the “corporate shield”81 when an entity such as a
hospital makes a payment on a claim without identifying the individual practitioner, or
the practitioner is dismissed from the suit prior to settlement or judgment.82
To compound these concerns, reports of medical malpractice payments to the
NPDB may not be a reliable indication of physician incompetence, and may have become
partly anachronistic and superfluous.83 The NPDB reports do not capture the overall
picture of malpractice well for several reasons: (1) there is little connection between
negligence and filed claims,84 (2) reports resulting from litigation are delayed whereas
reports resulting from settlement are immediate,85 (3) penalties for failure to report are
76

See Morreim, supra note 4 at 275.

77

Morreim, supra note 4 at 274-75.

78

See e.g., Am. Dental Ass’n v. Shalala, 3 F.3d 445, 446 (D.C. Cir. 1993).

79

Health Res. & Servs. Admin., U.S. Dep’t of Health ad Human Servs., Pub. No. HRSA-95-225,
N ATIONAL P RACTITIONER D ATA B ANK G UIDEBOOK , E-12 (2001) [hereinafter NPDB G UIDEBOOK ],
available at http://www.npdb.hrsa.gov/resources/npdbguidebook.pdf. (“For the purposes of NPDB
reporting, medical malpractice payments are limited to exchanges of money. A refund of a fee is reportable
only if it results from a written complaint or claim demanding monetary payment for damages… A waiver
of debt is not considered a payment and should not be reported to the NPDB.”
80

Health Care Quality Improvement Act, 42 U.S.C. §11151(7) (2006).

81

A payment made as a result of a claim solely against an entity that does not name an individual
practitioner, is not reportable. NPDB G UIDEBOOK , supra note 79 at E-8.
82

Id. (“A payment made as a result of a suit or claim solely against an entity (for example, a hospital,
clinic, or group practice) and that does not identify an individual practitioner is not reportable under the
NPDB’s current regulations.”). Id. at E-12 (“A payment made to settle a medical malpractice claim or
action is not reportable to the NPDB if the defendant health care practitioner is dismissed form the lawsuit
prior to the settlement or judgment. However, if the dismissal results from a condition in the settlement or
release, then the payment is reportable.”).
83

See Morreim, supra note 4 at 278-291.

84

See id. at 278-279.

85

See id. at 279.
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not enforced,86 (4) not all physicians’ insurance contracts contain “consent to settle”
clauses,87 (5) different standards exist for reporting government physicians,88 and (6)
physicians providing charity work or work for the state may be shielded from liability via
charitable or sovereign immunity.89 Additionally, understanding of the causes of adverse
outcomes has changed since the implementation of the NPDB reporting requirements,90
as has the relationship between practitioners and hospitals,91 both of which work to
decrease the NPDB’s usefulness.92 Finally, because a problematic practitioner is likely to
be reported to the NPDB for other reasons, the medical malpractice payment reporting
may be unnecessary.93

86

See Morreim, supra note 4 at 279-283. Despite the possibility of an $11,000 penalty for failure to report,
underreporting occurs and the Health Service Resource Administration is reluctant to impose penalties
because the cost of levying and collecting those penalties may exceed the maximum amount that can be
assessed. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-01-130, NATIONAL PRACTITIONER DATA BANK:
MAJOR IMPROVEMENTS ARE NEEDED TO ENHANCE DATA BANK’S RELIABILITY, 5, 10-13 (2000), available
at http://www.gao.gov/assets/240/230998.pdf.
87

See Morreim, supra note 4 at 283-285. Some insurance contracts feature a “consent-to-settle” clause
permitting the physician to veto efforts to settle. Id. at 283.
88

See id. at 285-287. For example, military physicians can be reported only after several layers of
evaluation determine that the physician committed malpractice, and the malpractice caused the injury. Id.
at 285. See also, HEALTH RES. & SERVS. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., NATIONAL
PRACTITIONER DATA BANK 2012 ANNUAL REPORT, 7 (2014), available at http://www.npdb.hrsa.gov/
resources/reports/2012NPDBAnnualReport.pdf (“To obtain information from government entities,
the
Secretary of HHS entered into memorandums of agreement (MOA) with all relevant Federal agencies and
departments.”)
89

Morreim, supra note 4 at 286.

90

When it was passed, the HCQIA presumed adverse outcomes were the product of individual
carelessness; and through peer review systems, the identification, discipline, and restriction of those
individuals would lead to fewer adverse events. However, current understanding is that adverse outcomes
may be more a product of system-level flaws. Id. at 287-290.
91

In addition, when HCQIA was passed, hospitals held considerable leverage over physicians because
nearly all physicians needed to hold credentials and privileges therein. However, due to physician concerns
for efficiency and the establishment of free-standing centers providing services once only available in
hospitals, the current relationship between physicians and hospitals has changed dramatically, limiting the
importance of hospital credentials, thus decreasing the usefulness of NPDB reporting. Id. at 287-290.
92

Id.

93

A problematic physician may be reported to the NPDB as a result of adverse credentialing actions or
license restrictions; disciplinary actions are better indicators of competence than medical malpractice. Id.
at 293-94. See also, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-01-130, NATIONAL PRACTITIONER DATA
BANK: MAJOR IMPROVEMENTS ARE NEEDED TO ENHANCE DATA BANK’S RELIABILITY, 5, 4 (2000),
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d01130.pdf.

152  

V. DHHS RULING: APPLICABILITY OF THE NPDB REPORTING REQUIREMENTS
RECENTLY IMPLEMENTED PROGRAMS IN MASSACHUSETTS AND OREGON

TO

In response to requests from stakeholders, then-Secretary of DHHS, Kathleen
Sebelius, issued a ruling on May 22, 2014, interpreting NPDB reporting requirements in
light of the Oregon and Massachusetts laws.94 The requests included that of Public
Citizen95 asking the DHHS to designate payments under Oregon’s law as reportable to
NPDB;96 Oregon’s Governor John Kitzhaber asking the DHHS to deem payments under
Oregon’s law non-reportable;97 and the Massachusetts Alliance for Communication and
Resolution Following Medical Injury (“MACRMI”)98 asking the DHHS to require reports
of settlement payments only when a provider was found to violate the standard of care.99
The DHHS identified the Massachusetts and Oregon models as the only models
based on legislation that go beyond the basic elements of apology and disclosure by
incorporating the potential for compensation outside the court system, but speculated its
decision could influence other states as they develop similar models.100 Two issues were
resolved by the ruling: (1) “[w]hether payments made under Massachusetts’ DA&O
model and Oregon’s [E]arly [D]iscussion and [R]esolution law are reportable to the
NPDB” and (2) “[w]hether medical malpractice payments from all demands for payment,
verbal or written, must be reported to the NPDB.”101
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The ruling interprets the NPDB statute as requiring all payments made as a result
of a medical malpractice settlement to be reported to the NPDB if it included a written
claim or demand for payment.102 Thus, Massachusetts’ pre-litigation notice and
Oregon’s notice of an adverse event qualify as “written claims” when they include a
written demand for payment.103 The DHHS found this approach preferable because it is
consistent with the NPDB’s policies and practices, there is no statutory authority
allowing for reporting requirements to be based on whether the practitioner met the
standard of care, and it ensures standard reporting requirements across the country
regardless of state law.104 The DHHS declined, however, to include payment as a result
of a verbal demand in the reporting requirement.105
Instead, the ruling maintained
current policy by clarifying that only payments resulting from written demands are
reportable to the NPDB.106 The DHHS reasoned this approach is consistent with the
interpretation of the NPDB, preserves the value of information by keeping unverifiable
claims out, and enables maintenance of a more enforceable and verifiable requirement.107
The DHHS acknowledged its ruling could be viewed as a barrier to the goal of
improving patient safety and the quality of care, and an unwillingness to support
initiatives to reform medical malpractice liability.108
VI.

ANALYSIS

On the surface, the DHHS ruling has the potential to drastically impact the
effectiveness of both the Massachusetts and Oregon reforms; upon closer examination,
however, consequences may not be so dire. The DHHS ruling clarifies which kinds of
claims are reportable to the NPDB, requiring Massachusetts and Oregon practitioners to
report out-of-court settlements to the NPDB in cases where their respective state laws
purport to waive that requirement.109
The Massachusetts law proposed to only report cases where it was determined
that a practitioner failed to meet the standard of care.110 The DHHS ruling, however,
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compels reports to the NPDB, regardless of whether the standard of care was met, thus
bringing the Massachusetts’ pre-litigation notice into the reporting requirement.111
Oregon’s Early Discussion and Resolution program aimed to exempt claims not
proceeding to litigation,112 and specifically stipulated a payment made through mediation
is “not a payment resulting from a written claim or demand for payment.”113 The DHHS
ruling specifically targeted Oregon’s law when it determined that a notice of an adverse
event qualifies as a written claim, regardless of attempts to define it otherwise, thus
triggering an obligation to report when payment is made as a result of that notice.114
Because the pre-litigation notice in Massachusetts, and the patient notice of an
adverse event in Oregon trigger an obligation to report when a payment is made
regardless of whether the claim is resolved through discussion, mediation, or litigation,
the NPDB continues to diminish any incentive physicians have to actively participate in
early discussion and mediation. Rather than participating in discussions and fully
disclosing information to patients in the hopes of reaching a settlement, practitioners may
be more inclined to take their chances at litigation, thereby frustrating the overall
effectiveness of both the Massachusetts and Oregon reforms as methods to reduce
litigation and encourage resolution. In addition, because the DHHS ruling requires
reporting of all written demands or claims by patients, discussions initiated by providers
will result in a report to the NPDB if the patient makes a written claim at any time during
the process.115 Applying this ruling to provider-initiated discussions under Oregon’s
Early Discussion and Resolution program could decrease providers’ willingness to file
notices of adverse events that initiate the early discussion process. If fewer notices are
filed, fewer opportunities for patients and providers to come to the table for settlement
will be realized, thereby diminishing the overall effectiveness of the Oregon program.116
When read carefully, however, the DHHS ruling actually provides guidance that
may enable providers to work around the reporting requirement because it only requires
reports of payments resulting from written demands.117 Because the pre-litigation notice
qualifies as a written demand, Massachusetts providers will see no relief from this
specific stipulation, but Oregon providers may be able to interpret it in a way that enables
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them to utilize the Early Discussion and Resolution program without triggering a report
to the NPDB. Because reporting is only required when a written demand is made, there
are two situations where a payment may be made without requiring a report to the NPDB:
payments resulting from provider-initiated claims that do not include a written claim or
demand for payment,118 and payments resulting from non-written claims or demands.119
As a result of this “loophole,” providers in Oregon may be encouraged to initiate claims
themselves by filing a notice of adverse event rather than waiting for patients to do so.
As long as the patient does not make a written claim or demand during the discussion and
resolution process, even if a verbal demand is made, the practitioner will be insulated
from the reporting requirement.
Regardless of whether a written claim or demand for payment is made, providers
in both Oregon and Massachusetts may still find ways to participate in the programs and
reach settlement agreements without triggering the reporting requirement. Avenues to
avoid reporting to the NPDB that were available prior to the enactment of these reforms
are still available. These include resolutions such as making a payment out of pocket,
waiving the patient’s debt, refunding the patient’s payment, or utilizing the corporate
shield. These workarounds, however, will require support from the larger entities
involved. If hospitals and healthcare entities are willing to provide protection to
individual practitioners within their organization, they may enable those practitioners to
remain involved, and encourage them to work toward settlement without worrying about
receiving a permanent black mark in the NPDB as a result. By avoiding reporting to the
NPDB, these solutions counteract the negative effect the NPDB reporting requirement
has on practitioners’ willingness to engage in discussions with patients and work toward
an early resolution. If practitioners are more willing to engage in these discussions to
reach early resolution, the newly enacted programs in both Oregon and Massachusetts
will have a greater likelihood of success.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Medical malpractice reform has produced many changes throughout the years,
including the development of alternative dispute resolution programs that provide an
opportunity for increased communication between patients and providers and improve
patient safety. In direct conflict with its own stated goal of improving patient safety, the
DHHS specifically targeted reforms in Massachusetts and Oregon when it ruled reports
of medical malpractice payments are required any time a written claim is made, thereby
diminishing incentives for providers to engage in the early discussion and resolution
process. Although the ruling does nothing to prevent practitioners from pursuing avenues
already available to avoid the reporting requirement, many of these options are only
viable if healthcare entities are willing to protect individual practitioners by waiving
debts, refunding payments, or providing a corporate shield. Without this assistance,
practitioners will be forced to choose between settling a claim through early discussion
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which will result in a permanent black mark on their record, or pursuing litigation which
is more likely to result in a verdict for the practitioner. Thus, through their support of
individual practitioners, healthcare entities will have an integral role in ensuring the
success and effectiveness of newly enacted reforms in Massachusetts and Oregon and any
similar reform efforts modeled after them.
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